



NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD - **Public Hearing**

Conrail Derailment in Paulsboro, NJ with Vinyl Chloride Release

GROUP	3
EXHIBIT	
AV	

Agency / Organization

New Jersey DEP

Title

NJ Dept. of Environmental Protection  
(NJDEP-1295-1300) - Timeline and After  
Action Report

**From:** [VanFossen, Robert](#)  
**To:** [Gruzlovic, Debbie](#)  
**Subject:** FW: Paulsboro Conrail Incident  
**Date:** Wednesday, January 23, 2013 12:02:12 PM  
**Attachments:** [Train Derailment Initial Time Line.pdf.pdf](#)  
[Paulsboro AFR.docx](#)

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Deb..need this for Fridays mtg

Robert Van Fossen  
Director  
Emergency Management  
(609) **\*\* PII \*\***

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**From:** Pearson, Gary  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 23, 2013 11:29 AM  
**To:** Pflugh, Kerry  
**Cc:** Manuel, James; VanFossen, Robert  
**Subject:** Paulsboro Conrail Incident

Kerry, Bob asked me to forward the attached.

*Gary Pearson*, Assistant Director  
NJDEP Emergency Management

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973 **\*\* PII \*\***

**\*\* PII \*\***

# Conrail Train Derailment


Incident Location: Paulsboro, Gloucester County, Mantua Creek (East Jefferson Street)

Incident Date: Friday, November 30, 2012




## Paulsboro Train Derailment

### Time Line



0703 hours	Paulsboro resident reports incident to Gloucester County dispatch
0705 hours	Gloucester County dispatches Paulsboro Fire Department
0708 hours	Paulsboro Assistant Fire Chief arrives on location
0709 hours	Gloucester County HazMat Team and Paulsboro Refining Company HazMat Team requested by local Fire Department
0714 hours	Paulsboro OEM coordinator en route to the incident
0719 hours	NJDOT notified of the incident by County dispatch
0720 hours	The incident command post is established at [REDACTED] East Jefferson Street, Paulsboro
0727 hours	Gloucester County dispatch notifies the US Coast Guard
0730 hours	SFC Everingham notified of the incident (approximately)  A reverse 911 was sent out by the Gloucester County Communications via Global connect to Thorofare and Paulsboro zip codes to shelter in place. This was directed by the County OEM.
0732 hours	Paulsboro Refinery HazMat on location and begins assessment and air monitoring of area
0740 hours	Det. II Godish notified to respond to incident (approximately)  ROIC sends a notification via email reporting the incident
0753 hours	Shelter-in-place ordered by Paulsboro Police Department for Paulsboro residents
0756 hours	NJDEP Hotline received NRC Fax concerning the incident.
0800 hours	Det. II Godish arrives in Paulsboro (approximately)
0802 hours	NJDEP-BER Duty Officer, J. Hoyle, notified by DEP Communications Center pursuant to the fax from NRC. The initial notification indicated that Police and Fire were on-scene and that evacuations were occurring within a ½ mile radius. Other information concerning materials and number of railcars involved was confused. The BER Duty Officer immediately began the routine of notifying BER chain of command and making follow up calls to verify information.



0805 hours NJDEP - BER-2 Supervisor, J. Manuel, was notified by Duty Officer Hoyle of the incident and instructed him to continue gathering better information. J. Manuel notified Director VanFossen. Asst. Dir. Pearson was also advised, but had already heard news reports of the incident.

0807 hours NJDEP - Supervisor, J. Manuel, called BER Responder P. DiGangi to respond to the scene immediately and called Responder A. Carl to pick up additional monitoring equipment from the BER Office and respond to the scene as well.

0810 hours NJDEP - Information gathered by the Duty Officer and other sources continued to be partially accurate; at one point it was reported that both vinyl chloride and propane were leaking and the number of railcars reportedly involved varied.

NJDEP - J. Manuel also spoke to USEPA-Edison and received confirmation that they would be responding to the scene.

NJDEP - Supervisor J. Manuel spoke with the Duty Officer to receive information as it became available, passing that information to BER Responders en-route and to chain of command. Director VanFossen departed Lakewood for the incident scene in Paulsboro.

0828 hours The incident command post was relocated to St. James Church, Commerce and East Jefferson Street per the Incident Commander

0829 hours The NJ ROIC notified NJSP HMRU


0840 hours NJDEP - The first NJDEP Responder, P. DiGangi, arrived on-scene and began coordinating with local Fire Dept. personnel. Subsequently, he also began working with Gloucester Co. Health and T. Davis (DEP Air Enf.) to coordinate air monitoring.

0905 hours NJDEP - Supervisor J. Manuel received an update from Responder P. DiGangi that there is at least one railcar leaking vinyl chloride and no propane was involved. The initial vapor cloud had subsided. He stated that, per local authorities, most of the area was sheltered in place with some of the area close to the scene evacuated. He felt that the Command Post was in a bad location; too close to the scene and potentially downwind. There were conversations ongoing about relocating the command to a more appropriate location. DiGangi also reported that Dir. VanFossen was onsite.

0908 hours Gloucester County notifies mutual aid fire departments

0920 hours NJDEP - Additional BER Responders, A. Carl and J. Hoyle were en-route to the site, and were briefed by phone of the latest information. Information from the scene was that one vinyl chloride (stabilized) railcar was leaking and that there were a total of 4 tank-cars and 5 boxcars involved. Some were in the Mantua

Creek. Sheltering-in-place continued and the Paulsboro schools were closed. The USCG was reported to be on-scene, as were crews from Conrail.



0926 hours NJ ROIC advises that NJSP HMRU was en route

0933 hours Poly 1 is on location and metering/monitoring the area

0945 hours Gloucester County Dispatch notifies the RedCross

0955 hours The IC (local Fire Chief) leads a briefing in which Conrail gives an update on the incident. A decision is made to relocate the command post to Paulsboro Borough Hall building (approximately)

1015 hours NTSB is notified by NJSP ERB South

1045 hours The incident command post is moved to Paulsboro Borough Hall building

1230 hours NJDEP - J. Manuel received an update from the scene that the concentrations of vapor had dropped and that many more responders had arrived on site, including USEPA and additional USCG personnel. NJDEP and USEPA were working with Gloucester Co. and Conrail to set up an air monitoring program.

1245 hours The NJ Transit demobilizes buses

1330 hours NTSB arrives and begins investigation

1400 hours Captain Moore (USCG) arrives and is briefed on the incident (approximately)

1500 hours The Incident Command Post is moved to the Gloucester County Fire Marshall's Office in Clarksboro

These times were provided by the Gloucester County Communications Center, the NJ Department of Environmental Protection and the ROIC.



## **NJDEP Emergency Management After-Action Comments on Conrail Incident on 11/30/2012**

- Bureau of Emergency Response air monitoring Instruments must be kept in calibration through the prompt purchase of calibration gases upon expiration.
- The current DEP inventory of chemical-specific Detector Tubes needs to be updated with respect to materials commonly transported in the State in bulk quantities, and the stock adjusted appropriately.
- Bureau of Emergency Response monitoring instrumentation needs to be upgraded to current and emerging technologies. Current technology makes use of telemetry and computerized data management to document and manage monitoring results.
- When an incident involves public exposure, public facilities (schools, etc.) and evacuations, the NJDOH should provide an on-scene representative to participate in the Incident Command (reporting to the environmental unit). During this incident, coverage from DOH did not occur in a meaningful way until the end of operations and personnel provided were not always appropriate or properly briefed; this resulted in second-guessing from DOH management who clearly did not have a complete picture of operations.
- Bench depth is important and we need to work on it, we were challenged during this event due to the staffing needs of the on-going Hurricane Sandy Response and the needs of this response. Providing continuity and rotation of personnel is critical.
- The assistance of the EPA was critical in this incident with respect to the monitoring and data management software they were able to provide. Coordination between EPA and DEP went very well and provided necessary government oversight to the environmental operations as well as lending credibility.
- Gloucester Co. Health Dept. provided needed assistance with the monitoring operation; however the hazmat task-force did not continue participation past the initial response to the incident.
- The use of NJDEP press and public-relations personnel worked well for an incident of this scale, duration and level of public interest. This should be considered standard practice in similar deployments in order to relieve the burden on DEP-BER personnel.
- The rigidity of the ICS setup sometimes precluded quick reaction to issues that came up and produced a slowed, bureaucratic response to issues that should have been more quickly managed and dealt with.
- The facility provided by Gloucester Co. worked quite well to house the command structure for the incident.